

THE WORLD OF YET-TO-BE

*Through the chimerical land of
Product Planning where the dreaded
King Cost rules with awesome power*

BY GENE BOOTH

(EDITOR'S NOTE: This article by CAR LIFE'S Associate Editor begins a random series on the lesser-known processes by which the modern automobile is created and sold. Future installments by Mr. Booth will poke into the advanced research and engineering areas, the assembly process and the marketing-sales and promotional aspects. Hopefully, when the series is concluded, we will have outlined and explained why the present-day automobile is what it is, and why it isn't many things we might have wanted it to be.)



WHIRLING WINGED blossoms that were aircraft models, staked into a bouquet of shape, color and suspended motion replaced flowers in the corner cabinet vase. Except for the Super Sabre and an X-15, they were multi-engined jets, the B-58 Hustler, the B-52, and a Convair 880 in American Airlines paint. The accumulated output of a Revell or an AMT model car factory coated the broad window sills, lining that impromptu display surface with plastic splashes illustrating the entire annual evolution of an American automotive division from the end of World War II.

This was not a toy shop, but the office of a product planner—a glass-caged corner in the anachronistic building housing Lincoln-Mercury Division on Dearborn's Schaefer Ave. It seemed a fitting headquarters for what until recently were anachronistic automobiles. In a corner office was Richard M. Kimball (Manager, Product Planning-Light Cars), a streamlined individual with the slicked-back black hair of a Brylcreem commercial. His suit coat off and draped over a nearby chair, Kimball worked in shirt sleeves over a small file of papers on a small desk in the center of the room. There was momentary disappointment

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because, rather than appearing in his customary modish pastel dress shirt with fancy cuffs and collar, Kimball greeted us in an ordinary white shirt. Dick Kimball, we knew from past acquaintance, was no ordinary guy but instead a quick-witted, terse and eminently quotable person. He would be able to focus this quest, to pinpoint the function of product planning in the Soaring Sixties.

"We're sponges," said Kimball, supplying the instant quote as soon as we had stated our mission. "We sponge up ideas from inside the company, from outside, from everywhere we can find them. We soak up all of this and we can then squeeze out some practical proposals. This is more true now than it used to be. And one of the reasons for it is that the communications lines and systems are more open now than they used to be."

Kimball, conscious of a committee

shorter 202 series," he explained, "because we just weren't sure whether the public had become too convinced the Comet was merely a compact, economy car. Yet, because the market had been moving strongly into this intermediate area we had to have something more to offer. You remember how the Comet started—the 'first of the second-generation compacts' and all that. A little more dressed up, a few luxury touches, but still an economy car. I wanted to keep one foot on that base, but the pulse-taking we've done showed that we had to move up, too.

"There are some real considerations which the product planner has to keep in mind. Cost is most important. The investment required is a most serious consideration to the smaller producer, such as we are. We can't make up the dollars we could lose, if we weren't careful, by selling a million units. So we have to pick and choose carefully. We chose a larger car, but we tempered that choice by spending the bucks necessary to keep one series closer to what it had been."

Kimball touched upon another aspect of the product planner's function. "We

THE SCENE shifts to an ultra-modern building, across broad Rotunda Drive from an extinct airfield walled off to serve as Ford's Dearborn test track. From the fifth floor of this building, Ford Division's headquarters, we view a surrealistic slot car scene in the distance as present and prototype Ford cars, and their competition, move around the various tracks.

Sunlight floods through the glass wall, tinted an unreal hue by glass, and a single beam glances off the highly polished chrome of a steering wheel. Ross Humphrey, Mustang product planner, is examining the wood-rimmed sporting wheel, using his nail file to scratch a notch into the highly polished rim at an inconspicuous spot on the underside.

"What do you know?" Humphrey asks aloud. "It really is wood. You can't tell it from plastic." He explains about the wheel. "It came from a Chicago importer, who had gotten it from a Japanese supplier. He wants to know if we'd be interested, says he can handle the volume. It would cost about \$25, but I don't know. Is it that much better than the sporty wheel we already have?"

A buzzing intercom interrupted him and Humphrey leaned toward it, pressed the lighted button and listened as an associate described a problem that just had been discovered in installing a certain trim item. Humphrey said all right, he'd be in there in a few minutes to help iron it out, then hastened the summarizing of the Mustang from the planners' viewpoint. Next year's model, the '67, he said, is completed. Styling is finished and prints have been transmitted to engineering. Other prints are in purchasing, so that tools can be ordered. Quarter panel and hood dies are already built, but time remains for trim changes if needed.

Cars for two years away were still in the styling phase, taking form on sketch pads and in clay piles within a guarded inner sanctum at the Styling Center. Approval date for the clay models was to be in December, Humphrey said, then departed to referee a minor trim change decision for cars already rolling off the production line.

HAL SPERLICH is possessed of an unruly shock of crew-cut, a youthful-looking executive who would seem more

ager Donald N.) Frey couldn't or wouldn't do himself—if he had the time. Frey, as did (former general manager) Iacocca, has all kinds of ideas he would like to carry through himself, but it's just too complex. Whereas in a smaller industry he could do it on the back of an envelope, he needs some helpers here. And that's essentially what we are.

"What we do is recommend the planning—a product plan—to Frey, who in turn, if it meets his objectives and he likes it, recommends it to his bosses. So, product planning—yes, but subject to the approval of a higher authority.

"In a very broad sense, what the product planner does is try to analyze the car business—what it's all about, where it's been, where it is, where we think it's going—in terms of what we're doing, what our competitors are doing, in terms of how the market is changing. He tries from all that to establish alternative courses of action that would meet the corporation's product and financial objectives, and he analyzes these alternatives and recommends one or the other to top management."

Ford Division, Sperlich says, is es-

book is Ford Division's message to the engineering staff, to the auto assembly division, and to styling, telling them what we see ahead, which tells them what we think we'll want several years out. Part of the book is a standing plan we put together that says, for example, that in 1970 we're going to need an all-new whatsitsname. In addition, it describes what the new car will have to be and how it'll differ from the present car. It provides the basis for the whole manufacturing system, if you will, to focus on that point in time.

"We have a notion on how often you have to do a new car. On the day we're launching a new car, we can be pretty confident that it'll be tired merchandise not long from now. And whether it is or not, it's safest to assume that it will be. So at any point in time we have this standing plan that says when the next major change will occur on Ford, Falcon or Fairlane. This is supplemented by a whole variety of investigations for new products apart from those made by the five car lines.

"This includes some cycling for engineering and market impact. You can't


MEETINGS AMONG representatives of engineering, styling, cost analysis mark the start of a paper program three years ahead.



STYLISTS BEGIN sketching details and decorations designed to enhance the proposed product image.



BODY engineers busy




themselves with layout prints based on planners' hardpoints.

THOROUGH STUDY, particularly of cost penalties, is made for all component parts, including a newly designed piston versus existing ones.



HIGHER POWERED vehicles require transmission changes for more torque capacity.



meeting coming up in 15 min., in which 1968 models would be discussed, rushed on. "A lot of our marketing contacts are with dealers. We do this because we're a smaller company and it saves time. But it's something to be careful of; the answers we get from dealers are all too often colored by today's selling problems. It's what they've got versus what the competitor down the street has that's on their minds. They're not necessarily thinking about tomorrow, when the competition is going to be changed."

The two sizes of Comet, said Kimball, illustrate just one of the headaches of a product planner. "We had to have the

have to follow up all the time to see that a program, like the 1966 Comet, is going along as planned. It has to be executed according to the decisions made and there's all sorts of things that come up to throw a wrench into the works. If there are any engineering changes which come up, changes that affect the profit picture or production plans, then the whole thing comes right back to us."

Reaching for his coat, Kimball slipped into it and leafed through the file on his desk. "I wish we had more time, but I'm already 5 min. late for this meeting," he said, and the calendar in his head could almost be heard riffing over to 1968.

"We'll send this sample to engineering for a bunch of tests. If it stands up to punishment, we can take a closer look at it, analyze the costs. But generally, it's pretty sticky to deal with imported merchandise," Humphrey explains.

This referral of items among planners and engineers is commonplace and, says Humphrey, is an important phase of product planning. Once a given automobile is on the road, it may develop that something on it is costing too much, either more than was anticipated or proportionate to the total. Then new materials and methods provide means to bring production costs back into line.

at home in a college economics class than a Ford Division office. One wonders if he must produce an ID card should he choose to stop in a campus area pub. He speaks with an intensity and uncommon candor.

In the absence of his boss, Product Planning manager John Nevin, it falls upon Sperlich to outline the responsibilities of product planners. A former light car planning manager for Ford Division and now advanced product planning manager, Sperlich speaks with enthusiasm.

"In large measure, we don't do anything that (Ford Division General Man-

essentially a planning, engineering and marketing division; it doesn't produce a thing. And it has been decided to organize the product planning function separately—it could be organized within the marketing or the engineering end of the division. But as chief of a planning, marketing and engineering division, Frey gets to recommend what he thinks the division ought to be doing to the Ford corporate bosses, who control the purse strings.

Sperlich, swiveling around in his chair, indicates a white binder sandwiched in a row of black ones behind a locked glass plate in his bookcase. "In essence, this

change all five in one year and not change for four more years."

Sperlich explains that there used to be a standard 6-year chassis cycle, but thinking now is less in terms of a cycle on a given car and more in terms of cycling changes for all the products over a period of time, a necessity to achieve uniformity in levels of marketing effectiveness.

"We tend to program all new cars no more than four years out—simply as a discipline to the system. If you need the new car then, you've disciplined the system to have it ready. You may decide then to defer it, though there

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really isn't any strict pattern. It's more a function of industry action-reaction.

"With more cars on the market, there's a tendency to bunch big change and to live with minimum change. If you've got five cars, you don't have to change each of the cars a lot every year. I think you'll see a pattern of almost 2-year cycles, or almost 2-year model runs on a given car line. When you spread into that many car lines and thereby reduce the volume of any one, I think you'll see a tendency to bang off a run on a given model for, perhaps, a couple of years. Actually this will be a function of volume; in the higher volume issues, this won't be the case, but in the lower volume issues it certainly will be."

Then Sperlich stripped the glamorous facade away from styling secrecy, subliminal psychological research and exotic engineering efforts. Bereft of its bewitchery, what materialized was the taskmaster which drives the planner.

planning had "noodled for a year and a half or two years with the proposition that we probably would have to come up with a modernized Ford, say, about the '64 or '65 point in time, simply because technology doesn't last more than four or five years in this industry. During the year preceding approval of the program, a plan takes shape. Based on all the pre-program work that has gone on, the planner proposes that we can produce this kind of car, with these improvements versus the prior car and versus the competition, and he makes the first value judgment on whether he thinks that's worth however many millions this takes."

The '66 Falcon and Fairlane, although coming a year later, were faced in the early program with indications that the light car business probably wasn't big enough to sustain all the entries of all the builders, the planner went on. "Here again, there were many alternatives, ranging from knocking out one or the other of the entries, combining them into one, combining them into highly interchangeable cars, making Falcon smaller, making Falcon bigger, changing

that in the presentation won't last an hour. So we're spending more time on it and we're paid to try to be pretty close to right. The other thing is, there's a lot of conversation back and forth, there's a lot of input in our recommendations, particularly from top management and, for instance, Frey; we talk with him all the time. We're not parroting his ideas, but obviously a whole variety of give and take conversations are involved. We're fairly close when we finally come around to making a specific recommendation."

We had been chatting for the better part of an hour, merely warming up to subject, when we took the conversation on a tangent which had presented itself with mention of the Fairlane. Perhaps that "industry action-reaction" phrase could be clarified using the Fairlane as an example. Could it be, we wondered, that the '66 Fairlane was a response to the GTO? Quickly, candidly, Sperlich launched into the background:

"Yeah, the Fairlane GT is literally that. They discovered a market for the big-engined intermediate with their Tempest and we're trying to get a piece

people buy. And we knew that the Fairlane needed a shift in image. And, while there's a lot of profit and a lot of money in the car business, we couldn't do everything at once. We have some limitations in investments and manpower and we couldn't do all-new Mustangs in '64½ and all-new Fords in '65 and all-new light cars and six other things at the same time. So something had to go, and back when we might have liked to do what they were doing with the GTO and the Tempest, we were spending a lot of our bucks on doing Mustang."

Sperlich sketches in some details about how Ford product planning is approaching that changing market. "At this point we're proposing both marketing and product strategy that the division ought to employ for the next five years—in the world through '68, which we call the current world, and in the world beyond that, which can be called the not-yet-approved world, or advanced world. Here again, we find out whether management buys our proposed strategy. Studies are done at least annually in which we try to chart where we're going and then try to discuss how the market

So we're working on certain cars which are planned to have major emphasis, major changes in '69 which will have several alternative actions understudied by engineering and styling. The product planner in this instance is working with engineers and the stylist in terms of developing those specific alternatives. The product planner is closer to what is going on in the market than the engineer or the stylist."

Almost two hours had passed while Sperlich instructed us in the alchemy of the planning office, and while he enjoyed the chance to rephrase the litany for an outsider, it was getting late. He chose this moment to philosophize a bit, when his eye strayed to a magazine advertisement which was pinned to his bulletin board.

"Take this Honda thing," he said, pointing to the ad. "Five years ago, people wouldn't have gone out and blown \$700 average for a bike for a weekend. The economy wasn't right. But that industry has sold half a million units this year of these light bikes. That's something we product planners have to take into consideration, not because we

can do is describe the limits of the economy and the industry—the upper and lower limits—and assign a probability to circumstance A or B happening. And really what you have to do is to plan, not for any eventuality, but you have to plan for the probabilities of A or B happening."


ONE PLACE in the complex of Ford Motor Co. where security is rigidly maintained is the Styling Center. The visitor is met by a stunningly styled receptionist, planted amidst highly stylized paintings and miniature cars, who smilingly presents a pass form to be filled. Behind her, like a chaperon, is a uniformed and armed guard. If an appointment has been made with the person to be seen, the visitor gets a numbered badge admitting him to the unknown area beyond the lobby.

Our appointment was with Will Scott, executive director of Ford's Central Product Planning Office whose press biography identifies him as coordinator of forward product programs for the various vehicle divisions and overseas companies. A lean, crisp man of about

TRIM hardware gets special attention for modern market.




CLEAR PLASTIC body model begins to take shape to insure proper fit of all optional parts.




STYLING CENTER has been busy finishing fiberglass model for planning committee approval.



THOUGH NOT produced, Allegro (left) contributed many features to the Mustang fastback, such as proportions, grille shape, passenger compartment slope.



INTERIM STYLING show car, Mustang II, displayed dashboard treatment planners liked (see over).



"The thing that tends to control the fact that all five aren't new every year is the profit objective. The product planner is trying to propose alternative product plans to meet corporate objectives. The stockholders couldn't care less how we made \$710 million in 1965. It was the fact that we made it that makes them happy. So the thing to start with is the profit objective—or return (on investment) would be more specifically objective. So, obviously, cycle planning is heavily influenced by the profit objectives."

About 27 months before the '65 Ford was introduced, Sperlich said, product

the body. We finally concluded that we needed a fairly general modernizing. The kind of quality level that was acceptable for the '60 Falcon we didn't think would be acceptable in the last half of the 1960s. That car had to be redone. And the Fairlane needed a fairly extensive re-do. Frankly, we saw an opportunity to gain some rather substantial interchangeability between the two cars. Here again, alternatives were put forward and were bought."

Recommendations of the planners are usually accepted for two reasons, according to Sperlich. "Number one, we'll spend thousands of hours on something

of it. They were a little more bullish about it. At any one point of time, you'll find us in agony in 17 places responding with Fairlane GTs to Tempest GTOs, to call a spade a spade. And you'll find GM in agony in 17 places, and they're doing Chevy IIs to counter Falcons or Panthers to counter Mustangs. So at any point of time, you know, we're bleeding from the arm and they're bleeding from the leg and we're doing something about it.

"It goes beyond that, too, because we're sometimes smarter than we look. For example, we knew there was going to be an upswing in the type of car

will be different and how we'll meet it."

"Then we start to formulate general plans on where you want to go, kinds of products you want to field, the general images they'll have or you want them to have. The second thing that comes out of these studies is specific studies of alternatives," he said. "The advanced cars, '69s and forward, are not yet formally approved, but obviously there're all kinds of work going on. At the moment, this really consists of several alternatives which are being carried along with no firm decisions yet, with a date next June for top management to recommend a specific course of action.

want to get into the bike business, but what's the national humored reason for this happening? What's going on in people's minds, to cause them to blow \$700 on a weekend, and how should that influence us as makers—not of Hondas, but of cars?"

"It's a fairly changing kind of world we live in. The product planner is simply trying to cope with these things. But really, in the final analysis, we project an economy and we project what we think the national economy will be and the automobile business will be within it. But really what you end up doing, is you can't guess what it will be, so all you

40, he moves quickly, purposefully, to the door of the next office to fetch his "alter ego," Chalmers L. Goyert, to join the discussion. Goyert, director of Central Product Planning Office committee staff and responsible for special studies and liaison work, is an amiable hulk of a man, well on his way to a tidy Mr. Clean hair style.

"The problems of the planner would be as simple as possible if he didn't have to worry about costs," says Scott. "Boiled down to the essentials, it is to provide the highest value at the lowest possible price." Compromise is up to the planner, explains Scott. This goal of

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competitive costs often means it's necessary to have extremely clever engineering and planning. "But," he adds, "even costs are not cut and dried; they require judgment to handle. The planner has to consider the relative piece cost versus investment. All costs are discretionary."

"The planner must consider alternative ways to spend money in order to make money. He has to spend it prudently. In the final analysis, we're really like a bunch of investment counsellors, recommending an investment—the particular product alternative—to the corporate committee. And the corporate committee is like a loan committee, ready and able to spend great sums of money to build a car to earn more money."

Where does Central Staff fit in? Goyert and Scott explain that the Central office is staff, dealing more in the policy side of things and exercising functional supervision among the divisional efforts. This includes not only

vanced engineering. What we've done here is created a focus, a direction for some of the projects going on. Why, there's something like 500 projects, identifiable projects, going on right now in research engineering, and that's just one area. It's hard enough to keep a list of what's going on, let alone understanding it."

Scott adds, "It's like a book with a lot of different authors." It has required the development of a highly systematized approach for signoffs and procedures, which the Central office oversees. "Believe me, it takes tons of paper. And even so, we're never sure that everyone can be informed of all it is that he is supposed to know."

BY NOW FULLY exposed to the environment of product planning, we wandered into the office of John Onken, until recently the product planning manager for Fairlane. Onken, a relatively slight man with a face marked by the perennially quizzical expression of a friendly chipmunk, now is in charge of planning for T & C (transmission and chassis) Division.

crept up beyond the level anticipated for the car.

By March of 1963, the first draft of the program which was to be the 1966 Fairlane was in the works. At that time, Ford planners had learned what the forthcoming GM A-body cars would be like, in construction and in character, and worked from the assumption that the Chevelle, in Onken's words, "would come in right on top of the Fairlane." It was time to take stock of the year-old Fairlane, said Onken, occurring coincidentally during the height of a company drive to reduce the complexity of the product mix. "We knew we should try to develop new features, so it boiled down to finding out how to take money out of the basic car to pay for those features," he said.

"We originally proposed the coil-link rear suspension, which would be going on the big Ford a year earlier, but it turned out that it would cost too much—not the suspension parts, but in making a stronger body structure. And, as a matter of fact, our investigations showed that retaining the unitized body structure would be cheaper than

dinat, along with Will Scott, controller Fred G. Secrest, and Chalmers Goyert, secretary. The approval included only the 170- and 200-cu. in. Sixes at the time, proposals for the larger V-8 engines having been rejected.

Final approval of the '66 program came Sept. 30, 1963, when altered financial objectives were written in and the 260/289 V-8 engines were made options. The Falcon and Fairlane were separated by different front end sheet-metal at the time, though during the clay model development this subsequently changed to different basic structures for Sixes and V-8s. But, smiles Onken, things happened fast between then and December.

"The GTO appeared with a large V-8 engine and caused a lot of excitement, which seemed to suggest that we weren't paying enough attention, as much as GM was, to putting high performance into our light cars. The clay models for the '66s were just being approved, but we presented a formal letter to engineering asking them to develop the assumptions necessary toward installing our own 390-cu. in.

item. We didn't get started on that project until Jan. 28 of 1965, though engineering had had this transmission under development for some time. Anyway, we got it started and thought it would be only a temporary, low-ball production deal. But T & C found out that it could tool up for it in time for introduction, so we followed up a couple of weeks later with an authorizing letter saying to cut loose."


The workday was over by the time Onken had bared the background to us, so we thanked him and left. Walking down the darkening halls, we thought how nice it was that a company can plan down to a gnat's eyebrow the cost of producing a car and how much profit a dealer is likely to net in a year of selling them. We thought about the tons of paper programs, the mass of detailed costing and production procedures examined—yes, and even the new plants constructed because a certain car was expected to sell in certain numbers.

It was a complex equation. The product planner, we had found, often has to cut across lines of authority and


you go back to the Mustang, the point in time the Mustang was planned, you have a lot of product planning activity. You had the market research guys in a continual process of trying to call off new facts to astound people with. You had a lot of guys just plain interested in buff-type cars and guys like Don Frey yearning for the day he could bring out something more interesting than that which he had on the road, and you had Bordinat styling up interesting things because he liked interesting things. So you had a level of activity that couldn't help but produce a car that was better, that was distinctive."

He had continued: "Part of the reason the Mustang happened is purely and simply that the guys that happen to be running the Ford Division just happened to be buffs. We wanted to do some eye-catching things ourselves literally and the total performance thing was one to do. This was how we got into the Shelby (Cobra) thing, which was originally handled by product planning where it was a strictly low-ball thing, trying to get a little

FIVE-DIAL instrument panel finally appeared a year after production started.



COSTS AND TIME were saved for early production of Mustangs by utilizing Falcon instruments, special Rally-Pac cluster.




PLANNER Will Scott is the ultimate corporate referee.



FINAL OK for Mustang fastback comes from top management, caught in rare photo of secret session.



GETTING COST breakdown are (from left) Goyert, Henry Ford II, Mills, Miller, Scott, Iacocca, Misch, Nevin, Lorenz, Patterson and Frey.



Ford Division and Lincoln-Mercury Division, but also the tractor and overseas operations. "The divisions are responsible for recommending the car lines, although corporate management still has final approval. But before the product recommendations are brought up to the corporation for decision, it is our job to make a full and complete disclosure of everything going on to everyone who needs to know. We must make sure we don't get surprises once the paper program is implemented.

"Increasingly," Goyert continues, "our emphasis is on down-the-road—working with advanced styling and ad-

He thumbed back through the collected papers which documented the various Fairlane alternatives and decisions to refresh his memory.

"Originally, the Fairlane was conceived as the car that ought to replace the Falcon," Onken recalls. Work started on it, from the planner's standpoint, in 1959 for the 1962 introduction. It originally came out only as a sedan, but in the first year could claim to be third largest selling in the industry. However, two things became apparent: The car really was unexciting to the public, though it was satisfying from the planners' viewpoint, and costs had

switching to a GM-type body/frame configuration of equal strength. We investigated package size and came up with recommendations. All of these proposals were drawn up, thoroughly costed out and ready for the decision of the Corporate Product Planning Committee in June of 1963." Onken adds that this paper program was approved and the financial conditions set by the committee, consisting of chairman Henry Ford II, president Arjay Miller, executive vice president Charles H. Patterson, and vice presidents William Clay Ford, Benson Ford, Herb Minsch, Paul Lorenz and Eugene Bor-

engine in the car. Fortunately, they had been thinking along these lines over there, too, so it didn't take very long for them to answer with the necessary assumptions. But it still took six weeks, as it always does, for purchasing to investigate the question. Then, in February of 1964, we went before the committee again and proposed the 390 for the Fairlane, dropping the 240-cu. in. Six and putting a V-8 into the Falcon for '66. All of this was in response to the GM emphasis on performance in their light cars.

"As far as the Sportshift, the GTA, was concerned, that was a very late

chains of command. He has to correlate, cajole, receive and react. And above all, he has to know, without a moment's doubt or hesitation, Exactly What It Will Cost. We had discovered all of that, but found ourselves wondering: Is there anybody around here who likes cars, purely and simply, for their own sake?

And then a statement that had been made by Sperlich came back to mind. "People will ask you did what on this or on that car program, and did product planning have anything to do with that, or did styling have anything to do with this?" he had said. "Really, if

press out of it." Then, he said, it grew.

He had gone on briefly, tracing the influence of product planning through to the GT-40. And there had been 427 Fairlanes and disc brakes and other touches that indicated the serious driver had entered the equation. Perhaps, in three years, we'll see a car in the showroom that goes, stops, steers, handles and looks like the cars enthusiasts have asked for. Then we'll know that while we had talked '66 with the planners they had fooled us and thought '69, that somehow they got past Cost and arrived at Better. Perhaps. ■